Monday, December 23, 2013
This is an archive edition of AHN that first appeared in 2010. The second half of my Milton lecture will appear next week. Best wishes to all for a happily restful holiday week and a productive 2014.
Jim is observing Christmas. Not "the holidays," not "the season," but Christmas. On balance, the United States is probably still statistically a Christian nation, but its elite is largely secular, and that which isn't is religiously diverse.
Insofar as Christmas really is a minority observance among the people whose eyes may cross this blog, I don't regard that as a problem. Notwithstanding complaints on the part of some, there is no "war" on Christmas. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical, if not hostile, to Christianity in general and Roman Catholicism (which I practice) in particular. But I don't think you have to be religious or Christian to find hope and cheer in a scenario of a poor child in a remote place coming into the world and transforming it by the power of word and example. And that a few wise men would sense something afoot and seek out the child (as well as a powerful satrap who would be thwarted in the attempt to find and kill a future rival). As would become clear over time, that child was never meant to be a secular king. His work, and his legacy, would prove more durable.
Merry Christmas to all. -- J.C.
Thursday, December 19, 2013
Interesting Times (Part II)
The following is the second segment of my 2013 Heyburn Lecture, delivered this month at Milton Academy in Milton, Massachusetts. The first segment is below; subsequent posts will follow.
In the faux-Chinese sense of the term, the last interesting
time in U.S. history was the Second World War. That war was interesting in any sense of the term:
fascinating, frightening, challenging, momentous. It called for the expenditure
of blood and treasure on an epic scale unprecedented in our national history.
We can talk about some of the details later. But you don’t need me to tell you
that the struggle against Japan and Germany in 1941-45 was one of the truly big
events in the history of the world and had a tremendous impact on our
subsequent national history. You know that. You’ve picked it up by osmosis in the
movies you’ve seen, the stories you’ve heard, the classes you’ve taken.
Here are some other things you also know – things you may
not have been told but instantly grasp if you haven’t: that a nation waging two
wars on either side of an ocean at the same time was a major
accomplishment. That in the
process, hundreds of thousands of Americans died in the conflict, causing
untold grief to their loved ones and depriving the survivors of their talents
and untapped potential. And that a lot of developments that happened after the war have origins in the war, whether in the realm of
technology (computers, space travel), social change (women in the workplace),
or subsequent political struggles (all those Communists).
And here’s something else you’ve always known: our side
won. Winning meant some very big and obvious things. Some of those things can
be defined in negative terms, in the sense of what didn’t happen or what was
stopped: the enslavement of the Koreans and Chinese at the hands of the
Japanese; the end of a Holocaust that had already engulfed millions and would
have engulfed millions more. Societies that had been liberal democracies before
the war, notably Great Britain, were able to resume their way of life.
Other good things that happened can be defined in more
positive terms. Our two great adversaries were reconstructed, also as liberal
democracies, an outcome that was certainly a matter of self-interest, but also
one that led to the creation of prosperous societies that allowed them to take
their place in the family of nations with a degree of prominence and influence
appropriate to the notable talents of their peoples. More generally, the
victory of the United States and its allies in the Second World War resulted in
the creation of a world order that was highly favorable to the United States,
even if that order seemed continually under threat by its enemies and the long
shadow of nuclear destruction.
I should concede: that’s a big “if.” The fear of Communism
– from the Soviet Union, followed soon thereafter by the triumph of a Communist
regime in China – loomed very large and very dark in the consciousness of
Americans in the years following the war. What loomed even larger and darker
was the legacy of the Pandora’s Box that got opened when the U.S. dropped two
atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, an event with terrifying implications that
loomed larger a mere four years later when the Soviets detonated nuclear
weapons as well. Many Americans were confused and angry that after achieving
such a decisive victory, now subject to instant apocalypse at any time. They
asked questions like “Who lost China?” as if China was ever really ours to
lose.
But in a way that could only be fully appreciated in
retrospect (though some observers did sense it at the time), the terrible
danger posed by prospect of human catastrophe – captured by the phrase
“Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) – had the effect of restraining the United
States and its rivals, diverting their tensions into a series of smaller wars
fought around the globe for a half-century. The people caught in the middle of
these struggles – in places like Korea and Guatemala, Iran and Vietnam – were
forced to live through interesting times indeed. Some of these struggles seemed
more justified for the United States than others (very few of them were truly
necessary). And some, notably Vietnam, proved quite costly in any number of
terms. But in some literal as well as figurative sense, all these conflicts
were far away to most Americans, even if they captured the public’s fitful
attention, and even if they pierced the hearts, minds and souls of some
Americans some of the time.
Because that’s one of the two most important things that
the World War II bought for the United States: distance. For most of its
history, the nation enjoyed the incalculable advantage of being oceans apart
from any people who posed a threat to its territorial security. Instead, it
continually encroached on its neighbors, especially native peoples, in every
direction. U.S. victory in the Second World War guaranteed secure territorial
boundaries – with layers of insulation reaching half a world away – and made it
possible, notwithstanding persistent anxiety, that the danger of foreign
occupation would be remote. I’m sure you’ve had any number of worries during
your high school years. But territorial conquest of your dormitory hasn’t been
one of them. And hasn’t been since Milton Academy was founded in 1798, though
there was a war scare with France that year.
The other important thing World War II bought the United
States was time. It could live for decades off the economic and political gains
it reaped from victory in the war. It was this moment, more than any other,
where the mass pursuit – and fulfillment – of what I call “the Dream of the
Coast” was realized. As I explain, the Coast is both literal (as in West Coast,
more specifically California, the epicenter of the postwar American Dream) and
figurative (“coast” as a verb, as in gliding frictionlessly from aspiration to
reality).
Again: the nation was prosperous before the Second World
War, and its international stature had been rising. But the war brought about
what one famous journalist dubbed “the American Century,” an era of prosperity
and internal stability – a Dream of the Good Life – that is the hallmark of all
great empires, whatever political shape they may happen to assume.
This, more than anything else, has been your inheritance.
It’s not just that many of the hallmarks of modern life – the interstate
highways that stitch the nation together; the World Wide Web that does
virtually the same thing; the mass availability of colleges and universities
that represent the most concrete embodiments of your aspirations – all date
from the Second World War or experienced a turning point because of it. It’s
also important to note that the basic governing institutions of your life have
been sufficiently functional that the closing of such traffic has been the
exception, not the rule. You expect the electricity to work, the stores to be
open, the holidays to be observed. Disruptions like terrorism are scary
precisely because they’re so extraordinary. That Frisbee that sails across the
quad; that dog you’re walking through the woods; that laundry in the dryer
that’s clean and warm: it’s all been bought, and maintained, with blood.
It’s not that there haven’t been memorable moments of
domestic unrest. Clearly, there have been such moments, some severe. But the
most important disruptions in the lifetimes of your older relatives, like the
Civil Rights movement – an event that also had deep roots in the Second World
War – were usually the product of rising expectations, not falling ones.
Prosperity has a way of bringing internal conflicts to the fore.
To a great extent, the gains procured by the Civil Rights
movement and other struggles that followed in its wake reflected the
persistence, ingenuity, and morality of those who sought to secure and expand
social justice. But they also
reflected a calculation on the part of people in power that they could afford
to accommodate such expansions, a calculation rooted in the dividends paid by
victory in the Second World War. This did not necessarily mean such people were
enlightened. Nor did it mean that the nation was inexorably evolving in the
direction of Progress, though the economic logic of the time suggested that
calls for redistribution of wealth could be resolved by making the proverbial
pie bigger, not cutting it differently. The margins were somehow wider, the
possibilities greater, even if there were limits, as there always are, as to
how much those in positions of entrenched privilege are been willing to concede
to those who challenge them.
Next: The end of Post WWII Victory culture and what it means for you.
Next: The end of Post WWII Victory culture and what it means for you.
Monday, December 16, 2013
Interesting Times (Part I)
The following is the first segment of my 2013 Heyburn Lecture, delivered this month at Milton Academy in Milton, Massachusetts. Subsequent posts will follow.
Okay.
So here’s my opening statement: You have not lived in interesting times.
Neither have your parents. Nor your grandparents.
Perhaps this strikes you as a strange, if not ridiculous or
pointless, assertion. You may be willing to concede that not all that much has
happened in your short, twenty-first century, lives. You had pretty much just
arrived, and barely remember, September 11, 2001, a truly terrible day in our
national history – and “terrible,” whatever else it may be, certainly qualifies
as “interesting.” Maybe you’d point to what seems to have been a fairly rapid
social change in law and attitude regarding gay marriage. Or wars in Iraq or
Afghanistan – these were big, long conflicts that have affected the lives of
lots of people.
But even if you would concede you have not come of age in interesting times, you’re less likely
to concede the point on behalf of your elders: they have had some interesting times. The creation of the Internet.
Feminism. The Civil Rights Movement. Surely these events count as interesting.
The mere fact that you, who will avow that you really don’t know all that much,
have at some point been told about such things suggests that they count for something. And even if they did not, you
could point to a relative who had a struggle or triumph that would qualify as
“interesting” in more than a narrow way, because such a personal drama –
financial setbacks, discrimination, entrepreneurial success, whatever – took
place against some larger historical backdrop.
I take the point. I don’t mean to diminish the significance
of these events at a personal level, any more than I want to diminish my own
lived experience or that of my own parents and children. It’s not that such
things don’t matter; they matter a great deal, not only on an individual level
but also as emblems of the American experience more generally. That poor
treatment your grandmother suffered as part of the larger saga of exclusion or
inequality in our national life; that business your dad started as a little
piece of the American Dream: they’re reflections of a shared national
experience. But again, the fact that such stories unfolded in the last 75 years
means that they haven’t happened in interesting times.
Maybe by now you’re zeroing in on “interesting”: what’s that supposed to mean? Maybe you’ve
heard the reputedly ancient Chinese curse: “May you live in interesting times.”
In that understated way we westerners sometimes associate with Asians, we grasp
the irony that “interesting” is actually a euphemism for “chaotic,” or
“dangerous,” or just plain “horrible.” Ironically, there’s little evidence that
the aphorism is widely known among the Chinese; the clearest recent documentation
of the phrase that I’ve found comes from the correspondence of a British
diplomat in China in the 1930s. Reeling from decades of colonial exploitation,
ripped apart by civil war, overrun by foreign invaders: times simply don’t get
much more “interesting” than they were in China during the thirties. Even the
greatest, most stable civilizations are subject to moments of great upheaval,
and China has had several in its storied history. But this was surely among the
worst. There aren’t many people alive in China who lived through those days,
but the collective memory of such events are what make the nation’s revival a
source of shared pride.
By comparison, there haven’t been all that many
“interesting” times in American history. The earliest days of colonial history
certainly qualify in terms of danger, brutality, and uncertainty. So does the
American Revolution. And the Civil War. As do any number of serious economic
downturns before the calamity of the Great Depression in the 1930s. All through
and between these periods, there were groups of people who subjected to
systematic suffering: their times never ceased to be anything but interesting. Yet their stories, real
and rich as they are, were woven into the fabric of nation’s master narrative
only recently. They have not been deemed interesting in the more conventional
sense of the term: commanding the attention of others to the point of being
documented and recollected. History is in some sense the conversation between a
shifting cast of characters who are understood to constitute a people at any
given time. Part of which involves the discovery or recovery of that which was
perceived as lost.
Next: The last interesting time: World War II.
Next: The last interesting time: World War II.
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
Place in Time (Part VI)
This is final installment of a series of posts about the role of regionalism in U.S. history.
-->
-->
What might all this discussion of regionalism mean for you? That
of course depends at least a bit on who “you” are, i.e. where you’re coming
from in some literal or figurative way. (I, for my part, am the grandson of an
Italian immigrant whose extended family, much of it Irish, is almost
exclusively Mid-Atlantic by birth. But by marriage, education, and temperament,
I am decidedly a Yankee in cultural affiliation.) Insofar as these regional
themes I’m talking about have any reality, they include plenty of exceptions.
You can find Chinese food in Tulsa (maybe not good Chinese food), and hear good bluegrass music in Manhattan
(maybe not real bluegrass). Even
overwhelmingly Republican Texas has Democratic pockets – which may soon become
more than pockets as the racial complexion of the state changes. There are
plenty of reasons, and ways, the nation-state will hold. Like our motto says, e pluribus unum (“out of many, one”).
On the other hand, there’s no reason to
think the borders of the United States will remain permanent. Considered solely
as a matter of topography, there’s nothing particularly cohesive about a
stretch of continent that’s marked by large stretches of forest, plains,
desert, and mountains, and which over the course of the last few thousand years
has been the home of a wide variety of peoples who interacted with each other
was well as lived in relative isolation. And many of our state boundaries –
consider the rectangles that constitute the Dakotas, for example – are really
matters of fictive convenience. Should the pressures, internal or external,
become great enough, different pieces of the nation could break off or
recombine in ways that are hard to foresee, but not exactly random, either.
Does that thought sadden you? At times
it saddens me, though I’ll confess I find myself exasperated enough with the
kinds of things I hear or see coming out of South Carolina and find myself
thinking our lives would be a lot easier if we went our separate ways. I get
annoyed at the way Idahoans complain about the intrusiveness of the federal
government, even as they depend on it for the roads, jobs, and markets that
keep it afloat. In recent years I’ve heard secessionist noise coming out of
Texas, to which I feel inclined to say, “erring sisters, go in peace,”
especially since I regard the circumstances by which Texas entered the Union to
be highly dubious. On the other hand, I’m not sure any of the rest of the
nation was much, if any, less so as a matter of moral legitimacy.
The real point of this particular
conversation is less about making predictions or arguing for the value of one
part of the country over the other than it is asking you to consider what you
consider important about your national identity. What do you think it means to
be an American? Is it a landscape, a set of habits, or a series of ideas? Are
the things you value rooted more in one part of the continent than another? How
bad would you feel if some part of it were to break off? And lastly, and more
importantly: where – and how – do you want to live? If you’re lucky, you may
have some choice in the matter. Try and exercise it wisely.
Friday, December 6, 2013
Freely Unequal (Part V)
The following is the final post in a series on freedom and equality in U.S. history. Previous posts are below.
-->
-->
There are two answers to the thorny problem of maintaining equality of opportunity while allowing for inequality of outcomes in contemporary American life.
The first is to refurbish the doctrine of Equality of Opportunity with a new
term: meritocracy. The idea here is that your going to this school, or getting
that job, is a matter of deserving it
after a fashion – not having earned
it exactly, but indicating a degree of promise that makes conferring privilege
a safe bet. But how does one measure this notion of fitness? Supposedly with
things like grades and test scores. But they often raised as many questions as
they answered. (Does the test measure what matters? Can it be gamed? Is it ethnocentric?)
People whose job it was to serve as gatekeepers of privilege took the edge of
any obvious or suspicious sense that the game was rigged by defining merit not
simply as a matter of empirical things like test scores or grades, but having
had experiences of adversity that one can plausibly believe will season one for
success. So it was that Affirmative Action and meritocracy came of age together
in the last third of the 20th century, even though they really
represent distinct, and perhaps conflicting, bases on which to measure merit.
My point here is not to challenge the
worthiness of any particular beneficiary of this system. (A scholarship boy who
rode good grades into a decent living, I am in many ways a beneficiary of it.)
My point here is that whatever its benefits, meritocracy has served to make
inequality stronger. Stronger, I think, than it really should be. We should be
more suspicious of inequality, less lulled into a sense of complacency that it
isn’t slavery.
Again: I recognize that inequality may
not only be inevitable, but actually useful. Certainly there are advantages to
everyone in rewarding talented people whose skills, inherited and acquired,
stand to benefit all of us. And given the inevitability that privilege is
always going to be parceled out in arbitrary ways – to quote the truism, life
is unfair – we need some mechanism
for sorting people. The problem is that we tend to have more faith in this
system than we should. For one thing, talent and skill isn’t always, or even
often, enlisted to benefit all of us. For another, that mechanism can create
the impression that life is more fair than it really is. The result is that we
tend to give inequality a pass in way we don’t when it comes to slavery.
Here’s a thought experiment for you.
Let’s say we did away with the doctrine of Equality of Opportunity and accepted
the reality of inequality of condition as the more pervasive and fixed reality
that it really is. Instead of telling you that there’s nothing you can’t be,
you would be told not to follow your dreams, that dreaming is a foolish and
even counterproductive proposition, and that you belong in a fixed stratum of
society. The key to success in your life would be understanding your the
possibilities and limits of the role you have been assigned. Part of that
understanding would involve a sense of reciprocal responsibility: the people
“above” you, whatever that might mean, would have obligations to you, and you
would have obligations to those “below” you. People wouldn’t necessarily meet
those obligations, but you would at least have that standard by which to
measure them.
My guess is that this doesn’t sound that
attractive to you. But it’s not chattel slavery – the owner of the slave has no
obligation to his property – and in fact resembles some relationships in
everyday life today, like that of parent and child. It sounds a feudal in its
dynamic of lord/vassal relations, but as a matter of fact, such an order has
prevailed for most of human history in one form or another (typically as a
class system). To be sure, it has its oppressions, and the history of western
life in the last 250 years has essentially been one long rebellion against it,
a rebellion in which the United States has long been at the vanguard and which
has been substantially, though not completely, successful (again, in large
measure because we are at least partially drawn to that against which we
rebel). But it doesn’t lie – or at least lie in the same way – about what
inequality is, how it works, how and attached we are to it. It also establishes
a standard of accountability by which inequality can at least be rejected, and
re-established on a sounder basis.
I doubt this pitch of mine is convincing
you, and as an elite white man who has been a beneficiary of the status quo,
it’s unseemly for me to tell you that you shouldn’t want what I have and/or
that you’d really be happier with an order where you knew, and accepted, your
place. My real goal here is less ideological than historical: I want you to see
the social order in which you live as a socially contingent one that came about
for a series of specific reasons based on things that happened in the past.
That social order has a logic to it – there are good reasons why things are the
way they are. Not good in the sense
of virtuous; good in the sense of understandable.
Actually, there are aspects of the way things are that are not good in any moral sense, that reflect collective dishonesty,
hypocrisy, fear. Knowing that things have been different – that other societies
have not made the mistakes we have, and have not been subject to the same hypocrisies – doesn’t necessarily make
them better. Almost always, there are tradeoffs involved. Chances are you’re
going to want to stick with what you know. In all times and places, this is
what humans tend to do. As no less an authority than Thomas Jefferson explained
in the Declaration of Independence, “all experience hath shown that mankind are
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves
by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.” That’s why a little
rebellion can be a good thing. (A lot of rebellion tends to replace one form of
oppression with another.)
And that’s what I suggesting here: that
when it comes to inequality, you should be a little rebellious. You simply
don’t have the power to change all that much, and even if you did, you have a
deeply human desire for distinction, to savor the experience of inequality. But
you should try to resist it. That’s why I invite to ask yourself when you find
yourself in a formal or informal social situation: What kind of inequality is
taking place here? What realities does it reflect? Do I like what I’m seeing?
Do I need it? Is there anything I can do to make it better, whether in terms of
word, gesture, or act?
I know: this isn’t going to happen all
that often. But it doesn’t need to for you to achieve the best kind of distinction in a democratic
republic: that of a good citizen.
One last thing. I need to point out that
however great his hostility to slavery, Abraham Lincoln believed deeply in the
doctrine of Equality of Opportunity. He experienced is as a living reality, and
described it with typically vivid, simple prose the year before he became
president – prose that helped him become
president:
There
is no such thing as a man who is a hired laborer, of a necessity, always
remaining in his early condition. The general rule is otherwise. I know it is
so; and I will tell you why. When at an early age, I was myself a hired
laborer, at twelve dollars per month; and therefore I do know that there is not
always the necessity for actual labor because once there was propriety in being
so. My understanding of the hired laborer is this: A young man finds himself of
an age to be dismissed from parental control; he has for his capital nothing,
save two strong hands that God has given him, a heart willing to labor, and a
freedom to choose the mode of his work and the manner of his employer; he has
got no soil nor shop, and he avails himself of the opportunity of hiring
himself to some man who has capital to pay him a fair day’s wages for a fair
day’s work. He is benefited by availing himself of that privilege. He works
industriously, he behaves soberly, and the result of a year or two’s labor is a
surplus of capital. Now he buys land on his own hook; he settles, marries,
begets sons and daughters, and in course of time he too has enough capital to
hire some new beginner.
It’s a beautiful vision. And
it may even be true in the 21st century. I want to believe
it is. But I think if we’re honest with ourselves, we know that it’s not as
easy as Lincoln makes it sound. I believe that were he around today, Lincoln
would say that if inequality is not wrong, it’s wrong more often we’re willing
to admit. And that we should fight its spread. That, I think, is what Lincoln
would do. You agree?
Monday, December 2, 2013
Freely Unequal (Part IV)
You’re probably familiar with a very old
and tiresome debate about whether the Civil War was really fought over slavery
or holding maintaining the Union. The key to understanding Lincoln’s
achievement as a politician, military leader, and moral visionary is the way in
which he was able to convince most of the American people that the only way to
save the Union was to end slavery, because the people who were trying to rend
the Union were using their slaves to aid the cause, and that only by depriving
them of this resource (by emancipating their slaves, enlisting African
Americans in the armed forces, and putting the whole issue to rest by ending
slavery everywhere) could the nation proceed.
In the long run – certainly not right
away, when he lost political support and suffered military setbacks – Lincoln
won that argument. He won it as a matter of military policy (the Emancipation
Proclamation), as a matter of law (the Thirteenth Amendment), and as matter of
enshrining as common sense that slavery simply didn’t work anymore, urging his
fellow Americans to dedicate themselves, as he put it in his Gettysburg
Address, to a “new birth of freedom.” Within a few years of the end of the
Civil War, even the seceded Southern states accepted this proposition, however
grudgingly, as the price of their reintegration into national life.
Not that former slaveholders, or their
many non-slaveholding allies, became any less racist. Indeed, in many cases
there were more determined than ever to keep the newly freed slaves in their
place, to use a phrase much favored by such people. Denied slavery, they turned
to the next best – maybe even better – thing: inequality. The principal, but by
no means only, avenue by which it was achieved was racial segregation. At
first, given the efforts of Northern, especially abolitionist, politicians to
hold the defeated region in check, segregation was primarily a matter of social
inequality, practiced on a local level. Later, as U.S. public opinion became
fatigued by the cost, literal and figurative, of the process of Reconstruction,
segregation became increasingly political as well. By the end of the 19th
century, a Jim Crow regime with pervasive legal, economic, and personal
dimensions was cemented in place, and would remain there for a half a century.
But it wasn’t slavery. That’s what we
kept telling ourselves. Poll taxes, literacy tests, even lynchings: not
slavery. Nor were other forms of inequality: discrimination against immigrants.
Exploitative wages that approached, if not crossed the line, into wage slavery.
A refusal to let women vote. You might not like these policies, they might even
be wrong. But they’re not slavery. Not chattel slavery, anyway.
For some kinds of inequality,
particularly those where it wasn’t easy to draw clear lines of race or gender
that could be used as an obvious basis of discrimination, there was another
tool at hand to justify the status quo: the doctrine of Equality of
Opportunity. Of course, not everyone is rich, this doctrine goes. But anyone can be rich. Or go to an elite school.
Or whatever. Equality of opportunity does not necessarily mean that one can
attain these things easily, or that it won’t be easier for some people than for
others. It simply says such things are possible
– effortlessly for some, perhaps, but attainable for anyone who wants them
badly enough. So it is that the principle equality of opportunity allows the
reality of equality of outcome.
Which, again, we all want too badly to
let go of. In fact, we want it so badly that we’re willing not to peer all that
hard about just how we define opportunity or just how broad it is. Having it
remain a little fuzzy makes inequality of condition easier to maintain.
In the twentieth century, however, those
old, seemingly clear, lines of race and gender became increasingly problematic.
The doctrine of Equality of Opportunity didn’t apply if there were formal rules
in place that barred you from even playing the game. In such cases, the gap
between theoretical inclusion and the reality of exclusion became glaring, even
frightening, in terms of what it might portend if allowed to continue,
especially on the part of elites anxious to justify their unequal status to
themselves, other Americans, and foreigners. Thanks to the Civil Rights
movement, many of these formal barriers were removed. No longer could
inequality be officially justified on the basis of race – or race alone. Women and people of other races
began appearing, usually in small numbers, at exclusive sites of privilege –
schools, clubs, neighborhoods – whose appeal, whose actual essence, was
inequality. The question now was how to protect minority status when anyone –
even those other minorities – could in theory participate.
Next: The uneasy marriage of meritocracy and affirmative action as partners in the quest for equality today.
Tuesday, November 26, 2013
Freely Unequal (Part III)
The following is part of a series of posts on the relationship
between freedom and equality in U.S. history. The previous posts are
below.
-->
Next: Freedom and Equality since the Civil War.
-->
Freedom and slavery grew up in tandem
with each other in England’s North American colonies. At the very moment Europeans
were striking out on their own in the hope of achieving economic, political, or
religious autonomy, they were imposing their will on others, near and far.
Slavery had been introduced into the western hemisphere by the Portuguese and
the Spanish when it became clear that the indigenous people of the Americas
were not going to meet their insatiable demand for labor (in large measure
because they were dying off so rapidly). So they introduced Africans to the
western hemisphere. Virginia was founded in 1607, and also soon had a labor
problem in terms of Englishmen being unable or unwilling to work. So in 1619 –
which is to say a year before Plymouth laid the foundations for New England –
slaves were imported into Virginia for the first time. By the time of the
American Revolution, the institution was established in all thirteen colonies.
To be sure, it was more central to the rice plantations of South Carolina than
it was small households of New Hampshire. On the other hand, the slave trade was important to places like
Newport, Rhode Island, even if there weren’t all that many slaves there.
Financing slaves, advertising slaves, insuring slaves, transporting slaves,
feeding slaves, clothing slaves: slavery was big business. A global business. Slavery and capitalism
went hand in hand.
That said, the morality of slavery was not exactly a topic of frequent discussion.
It was a fact of life, and not something anyone expected to go away. (Sort of
like poverty.) Virtually everybody lamented it. But there was little effort to
do away with it.
I do need to emphasize that from the
start there were people who thought
slavery was wrong, said so in no uncertain terms, and did what they could to
limit or even eliminate it from their day-to-day-lives. Most of these voices
were religious, and would emphasize that all human beings were God’s children.
Many (though not all) of the Quakers were opposed to slavery, making large
swaths of Pennsylvania a relative haven of personal liberty. The most famous
work advocating the abolition of slavery in the colonial era came from judge
Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts, who had been one on of the magistrates in the
Salem witch trials of 1692 (the only one to subsequently apologize for his role
in the affair). Sewall protested the sale of slave who had been promised his
freedom in The Selling of Joseph
(1701), a three-page missive that mixed biblical injunction with language we
would find racist (“there is
such a disparity in their Conditions, Color & Hair, that they can never
embody with us, and grow up into orderly Families,” a sentiment Abraham Lincoln
would repeat a century and a half later in those Lincoln-Douglas debates: “There is a physical difference between the white
and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living
together on terms of social and political equality”). But the heart of Sewall’s argument, that
slavery rends husband and wife, parent and child, that God has joined together,
and that the barbarity of the slave trade made European accusations of African
savagery seem hypocritical at best, was a common view over the course of the
next century.
Even among slaveholders. As a whole, they
regarded what they called “the peculiar institution” as a necessary evil. It
was one they would fight hard for – the Revolution was touch-and-go in South
Carolina and Georgia because of slaveholder fears of losing their property,
something they fought hard to maintain in the debates over the Constitution –
but not one they typically argued was a positive good. This was particularly
true of the Founding Fathers like Thomas Jefferson, who famously wrote that he
trembled for his country when he remembered that God is just. “Would anyone
believe that I am the master of slaves of my own purchase!” Patrick Henry – he
of “give me liberty or give me death!” fame – wrote in 1773. “I am drawn by the
general inconvenience of living here [in Virginia] without them. I will not, I
can not, justify it.” (Henry, unlike Jefferson, freed his slaves at the time of
his death.)
Actually, there was a widespread belief among
many national leaders in the United States at the time of the Constitution that
slavery was a dying institution, because the number of black persons in the
United States appeared to be declining. The Constitutional provision for the
closing of the African slave trade in 1808 appeared to be another nail in
slavery’s coffin. The first national abolition organization, the American
Colonization Society, was founded in 1816 to purchase freedom for slaves and
resettle them in Africa with land the society purchased (Liberia, with it
capital, Monrovia, named after the current president.) The ACS boasted
high-profile charter members like Jefferson and Henry Clay.
By that point, however, the tide had already
begun going the other way. In the 1790s, a Connecticut Yankee named Eli Whitney
introduced a new engine, the cotton gin, which made this highly labor-intensive
crop fabulously profitable. New slave states – Kentucky (1791), Tennessee
(1796), Louisiana (1812) Mississippi (1817), among others, entered the Union.
By the time of the struggle over the fate of Missouri in 1820, which resulted
in the famous Compromise of 1820 brokered by Henry Clay, it was evident that
far from declining, slavery was an entrenched force in U.S. national life.
The argument for it remained largely pragmatic (mostly
economic). Yes, racism was rampant, and took a variety of forms that ran the
gamut from paternalism (slaves as children) to brute supremacy (slaves as animals).
But most of this logic was informal, even off-hand.
As has been well documented, this all began to
change in the 1830s, when a series of developments really changed the discourse
on slavery. The first was a sharp new note of urgency among abolitionists,
typified by the militant tone of New Englander William Lloyd Garrison, whose
newspaper, The Liberator, drew
national attention – and hostility, and not only in the South. Abolition was
part of a larger conversation about social reform that swept the Northern
states in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, but this sectional
accent proved uniquely threatening in terms of intensifying social conflict.
The second event was a major slave insurrection, Nat Turner’s Rebellion of
1831, which terrified the slaveholding states. (Slave revolts had been
occurring for centuries by that point, but were typically small, sporadic, and
covered up; this one took place in the glare of a growing national media
culture.) In the aftermath of the Turner rebellion, the Virginia legislature
actually debated a proposal to emancipate slaves in the state. But the bill was
defeated, and after that slavery ceased to be a topic of public discussion in
Southern life. In fact, southern postmasters refused to deliver materials it
considered incendiary, a rather striking rejection of the First Amendment in
the name of the freedom to own slaves.
From this point on, those with the deepest
investment in slavery, broadly understood, cast the institution not a necessary
evil, but a positive good. I could give you lots of quotes to this effect, but
the most succinct formulation comes from Alexander Stephens, a Georgia planter
who became vice-president of the Confederate States of America. In his famous
1861 “Cornerstone” speech, Stephens explained that his new government, the culmination
of decades of growing sectional agitation, “rests on the great truth that the
negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the
superior race, is his natural and moral condition.” (Note how closely slavery
is bound up with inequality here.) In the vehemence with which people like
Stephens made his case, I’m reminded of our contemporary discourse on guns,
where efforts at gun control have led to ever-more insistent claims that we
need more guns, the right to carry concealed guns, and fewer regulations for
those who own them.
There is of course a vast amount to be
said on the subject of slavery in American life, and only a very small amount I
can even begin to hope you might retain in anything I can tell you today. The
main point I want to emphasize is that strictly speaking, the Civil War was not
really about slavery, per se.
Instead, the fight was about the increasingly insistent assertion that slavery
was good and right and as such should not only be protected, but expanded. It
was this idea, rather than the
existence of slavery itself, that so upset Abraham Lincoln and the growing
number of people attracted to the way he framed the issue. Lincoln was also
upset over the widely held opinion, associated with his great rival Stephen
Douglas, who asserted that he didn’t care
one way or the other about the fate of slavery. Lincoln was willing to live
with slavery (which is why many abolitionists considered him politically lame).
What he couldn’t stand, and what he consistently fought his whole adult life,
was the idea that it was anything but an unavoidable compromise for the
establishment and a survival of a government he loved deeply, a love rooted in
his belief that it afforded great opportunities for people like him to advance in
the world. Over the course of his life Lincoln repeatedly compared slavery to a
tumor in the body politic that could not be cut out without endangering the
life of nation. It was one thing to accept this condition; it was another to
actively champion its spread. And so he drew the line.
Next: Freedom and Equality since the Civil War.
Friday, November 22, 2013
Freely Unequal (Part II)
The following is the second of a series of posts on the relationship between freedom and equality in U.S. history. The previous post is below.
Next: Freedom an inequality before the Civil War
In a contemporary context,
you may not find Abraham Lincoln's famous assertion that “if slavery is not wrong, then nothing is wrong” all that
remarkable a statement. You think of
that as natural, and always have. In fact, as far as you know, pretty much everyone thinks of it as natural. And
always has. If you or
someone you know doesn’t feel slavery
is wrong, such a sentiment is not likely to get public expression. We all
understand that there are plenty of ills in American society today, but we tend
to think slavery isn’t one of them, even though there are anecdotal reports of
it surfacing again, particularly in poor immigrant communities. Some of those
responsible for such evils justify their exploitation of others by
distinguishing what they do from slavery – “Hey, she can quit whenever she
wants” – and we (perhaps grudgingly) accept that distinction. There’s a line
there, a line between slave and free, that’s real and clear.
Except that there isn’t. Even when
slavery was widely practiced, there were different kinds. The kind you tend to
think of when you think about early American history is chattel slavery, in which some human beings were the personal
property of other human beings. They could be bought and sold like livestock or
inanimate objects, and had no say in their fate. But elsewhere in the world,
and at earlier times in the history of the world, slavery took different forms.
In the ancient world, winning armies would take the losers – or, very commonly,
their wives and children – as prizes, enslavement as the fruit of victory. In
many societies, however, slaves had formal and informal legal rights (like
religious privileges), might enjoy some degree of autonomy and mobility, and
could hope for earning or receiving their freedom. In ancient Rome, for
example, slaves could attain positions of considerable administrative power in
managing the affairs of their elite masters, and enjoy at least an element of
status greater than most freedmen.
In English North America this was rare.
Most slavery was chattel slavery. The practice of indentured servitude, in
which individuals were bound to a master for a fixed (in theory) term, was
technically not slavery. But during the period when a person was under such
supervision, they were for all intents and purposes enslaved – indentured
servitude was de facto, if not de jure, slavery. For much of American
history, people have also been subject to wage
slavery. Unlike chattel slaves, wage slaves are actually paid for their work.
But the pay they receive is so meager that they are entirely dependent on their
wages for their biological survival. As Karl Marx’s collaborator Frederick
Engels explained the concept in 1847, “The slave is sold once and for all; the
proletarian must sell himself daily and hourly.”
You may disagree that wage slavery is,
strictly speaking, slavery. You may say the same about indentured servitude
(though indentured servants were known to sell the services of their own
children in the hope of climbing out of debt themselves). But I think you would
have to admit that slavery has not really been exactly the same at all times
and places, and that whatever essence it may have is more subtle than it
appears. (You might also say that no man is a slave who can think for himself
or who can find some way to resist or subvert the will of his master – like the
proverbial “lazy” slave who can never seem to get work done – and at least some
people will agree with you. But not everybody.) To at least some degree,
slavery has a threshold – it’s less of a line than a spectrum.
If that’s that case, then what’s the
other end of that spectrum? Or, to put it more starkly: what’s the opposite of slavery? I believe most
people would say that the opposite of slavery is freedom. But I think the
matter is more complicated than that. Yes: slavery is a form of being subject
to restraint, and freedom is matter of lacking restraints, but the two tend to
interlock rather than diverge. In
fact, many people have argued – for thousands of years – that not only are
freedom and slavery compatible, but that freedom depends on slavery. For the ancient Greeks, a citizen could only
participate in politics when he had slaves to take care of the daily drudgery
of maintaining an estate and freeing him for the higher calling of statecraft.
Freedom is also more than political: there’s also religious freedom, economic
freedom, personal freedom, and so on.
There’s also the distinction to be made between positive freedom (freedom to) and negative freedom (freedom from).
In an American context, freedom is
typically defined in political terms: a negative freedom, expressed in limits
on what the government can do to you (limits like those in the Bill of Rights
in the Constitution, for example). One of the most cherished limits in
Anglo-American law is property rights – your sense of security in knowing that
what’s yours is yours, and that no one can take it away: that’s freedom. Including the freedom to own other people.
You think that sounds strange. But for almost 250 years, that was common sense.
It was also explicitly the law of the land.
So if the opposite of slavery is not
freedom, then what is? I’m not sure. But if slavery is a spectrum, I believe
the far end of it is equality. Equality – social, political, whatever – means
treating everybody the same. It means all people having an equivalent degree of
power in their relationship with each other, which means that no one has the
ability, or the right, to dominate or control anybody else. Equality is in this
sense a check on freedom, but the
experience of equality is also a form
of freedom, a knowledge that domination cannot be achieved nor imposed. Conversely,
inequality is the power differential,
the enabling mechanism, by which slavery becomes possible. Not inevitable – it’s possible to have
inequality without slavery: there’s space on the spectrum for that. But there
can be no slavery without inequality, and the greater the concentration of
inequality the greater tyranny can be.
The thing that I find endlessly
compelling – fascinating, confusing, troubling – is that while slavery is
virtually inadmissible in American life today, inequality is not. Plainly put,
we take it for granted. In a way, that’s not hard to understand at all. Certain
kinds of inequality not only seem permissible or necessary, but are actively
celebrated, like the championship team that prevails over its rivals and is
rewarded with a wealth of attention. Others are more ordinary: there are
certain things I can do, wages I will receive, by virtue – note that word – of
this degree or that expertise.
One reason we don’t find this especially
problematic is that some kinds of inequality have a sense of reciprocal
responsibility built into them. Parents have all kinds of power children don’t,
but there’s a collective social understanding that they are accountable for the
welfare of their children. That doesn’t always happen, of course. But it’s what
we expect. Similarly, as a teacher I have certain privileges that students
don’t – I don’t get detention – but my job is to aid your intellectual and
social development, and if I fail to do that there are any number of negative
consequences that will follow, ranging from you tuning me out, to making fun of
me behind my back, to me losing my job. One of the reasons I (unlike some)
don’t really consider the medieval institution of serfdom in medieval feudalism
to be a form of slavery is that there was always an understanding that the
serfs of a manor had a right to expect protection from their lord, which is one
of the reasons why medieval warfare so often took the form of armies ravaging
the countryside as a way of showing peasants that their current lord is failing
them and that they should transfer their loyalty. One could make the argument –
some did – that slavery, too, rested on reciprocal responsibility, but
slaveholders were inconsistent at best in making that argument, and it was
never codified as such in law. Under chattel slavery in the United States, you
had no more obligation to your slave than your hat.
There are forms of inequality in
contemporary life where there is no such sense of reciprocal responsibility,
either. Take good looks. We all
know that some of us are more physically attractive than others, and that while
there’s some degree of subjectivity involved in this, there’s general consensus
about who’s attractive and who’s not. But we don’t feel that being beautiful
confers any particular obligation to those who are less so. Unlike a college
degree, attractiveness is not something you can systemically acquire (even if
it requires increasing amounts of maintenance and will ultimately perish). Beauty
falls into the realm of what might be considered God-given. Like intelligence.
Or health. Or, to a great degree, wealth, which is very often inherited, and
where there’s no formal expectation you should simply give it all away, even if
there are pressures, internal or external, to convert it to some good use.
One key difference between feudalism and
more contemporary forms of inequality is that unlike feudalism, we tend not to
think of our inequalities as fixed. Children are not the equal of parents at the
start of their lives, but they often grow up and become parents themselves.
Intelligence, like wealth, may be inherited, but knowledge and money can be
earned – and such earned capital may prove to be more pivotal than the
inherited kind. Health gets gained, lost, and is relative. Even ugly ducklings
can turn into swans.
This is an important reason why we don’t
simply live with equality – we embrace
it, even promote it. A life where
everyone was equal in every way seems boring at best and oppressive at worst.
But, as we know, the reality of inequality imposes its own oppressions, some of
them very great. Moreover, if we look hard, we often find that inequalities are
a lot less fluid than they might seem. Not all
ugly ducklings become swans, or even that many. Enough do – or we tell ourselves enough do – so that we
can get away with assuring ourselves that the inequalities we live with are
temporary, inoffensive, even good.
This doesn’t happen with slavery: we
don’t accept it, much less celebrate it. We assume slavery is – was – bad. But that’s a problem. To be
clear: I’m not saying slavery is good, though I am saying it that it might be
helpful to understand a little better why there was a time when its evil was
not an assumption – in particular, I want to zero in on a specific moment when
slavery was aggressively upheld as a positive good – and to get a better sense
of its allure. Perhaps by acknowledging the appeal of slavery for those who
advocated it, we might gain a new understanding of its relationship with
inequality. In the process, we
might also gain a better of the what freedom, the concept that sits uneasily
between them, really means.
Next: Freedom an inequality before the Civil War
Saturday, November 16, 2013
Freely Unequal (Part I)
The following is the first of a series of posts on the relationship between freedom and equality in U.S. history.
Next: Varieties of slavery
“If slavery is not wrong, nothing is
wrong. --Abraham Lincoln, April 4, 1864
We all have our heroes. Mine is Abraham
Lincoln. I spend a fair amount of time asking myself, especially when I’m
dealing with a knotty problem in my job, WWLD: What Would Lincoln Do? As a
Christian, I also sometimes ask myself WWJD – What Would Jesus Do? – but I tend
to find the Lincoln question more arresting. Jesus was divine; Lincoln was
mortal. By that I mean not only that he died a tragically premature death
(Jesus did that, too), but that he was a fallible human being. I’m not sure,
for example, that Lincoln was all that great a husband – he was away from home
for long stretches of time, and I believe the stories I’ve heard about shouting
matches with his wife at the Lincoln home in Springfield Illinois, where he
spent most of his adult life. Nor do I think he was all that great a father. He
seems to have had a chilly relationship with his oldest son, Robert, which I
suspect was not entirely Robert’s fault (though I must say I never found much
to like about Robert Lincoln, who always struck me as chilliness personified).
Conversely, Lincoln seems to have been indulgent, to the point of
irresponsible, with his sons Tad and Willie when he was in the White House.
(Willie, who got sick and died in the White House, was apparently the one who
was most like his dad, and it breaks my heart every time I read Lincoln say, “I
know he is better off in heaven, but then we loved him so.”) Lincoln’s relationship
with his own father wasn’t that great, either. He refused to refused to go see
Thomas Lincoln when he was dying, telling his cousin that he suspected the
encounter would be more painful for his father than his absence would be.
And that’s just the private Lincoln.
Lincoln was racist. (He said so himself: “I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior
position assigned to the white race,” he explained in the Lincoln-Douglas
debates of 1858.) Lincoln misjudged the determination of southern
states to secede. He pushed his generals into battle sooner than he should have
at the start of the Civil War. You get the idea: the guy screwed up a few
things along the way.
But, my God, Lincoln was a deeply
admirable man. The clarity of his thinking – the way he was able to slice
through to the heart of an issue and frame it not in a persuasive, but deeply
moving way. His instinctive sense of generosity toward opponents, a refusal to
believe other people were any worse than he was, even when he disagreed with
them profoundly. And his sense of humor. Lincoln makes me laugh all the time –
“God must love ugly people; he made so many of them”; “Better to remain silent
and be thought a fool than to speak out and remove all doubt”; describing Union
General Joe Hooker as having his headquarters where his hindquarters should be
– the one liners and jokes are sprinkled across various accounts of his life
and never fail to amuse me.
But the real reason Lincoln is so
important to me is that he has decisively shaped my moral imagination. To put
it more simply, he has durably defined the line between right and wrong. And
you know what? He hasn’t just done this for me. He’s pretty much set our
national standard for morality for the last 150 years.
This is a bold, and somewhat touchy,
claim. We Americans, especially of the liberal stripe, get nervous when some of
us start making broad statements about good and evil (or even just start
tossing around words like “evil”); we tend to call that “imposing our morality”
on others. The matter is complicated further by the fact that there’s virtually
nothing that’s entirely universal as a matter of morality. Murder, incest,
rape: You not only can find people doing these things at any given time, but
you can find people justifying them
at any given time. Hell, you can even find people justifying them in the United States at different times. Of
course a lot turns on context and definitions (does one soldier killing another
constitute murder, for example? Is cousin marrying cousin incest? Can a husband
assert conjugal rights?), but that’s kind of my point – we tend to shy away
from absolutes.
But in at least one case, Lincoln
didn’t. It happened late in his life, in an 1864 letter to a supporter who had
been upset that Lincoln was recruiting African American soldiers in Kentucky, a
slave state that had barely remained in the Union, and one where putting black
men in uniforms and giving them guns was controversial, to put it mildly.
Lincoln apparently explained his position so effectively that this person, a
newspaper editor, that he asked Lincoln to write it down. Here, as Lincoln
remembered it, were his first words: “I am naturally
anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember
when I did not so think, and feel.”
If slavery is not wrong,
nothing is wrong: for Lincoln, slaveholding is the very essence of evil. For
him, this view is “natural,” and it’s one he’s always held. Simple and direct.
Now, at this point I’m going
to say two things you probably know but which I think I need to say. The first
is that prior to the Civil War, a great many Americans were not anti-slavery. They did not think of
it as wrong, and never had. The other is that that Lincoln certainly did not invent the notion that slavery was
wrong. That notion had been around as long as slavery itself had been around in
the Americas. Nor, until the last three years of his life, was Lincoln regarded
as any great champion of ending slavery among the people who cared most about
the issue. Indeed, a great many of these people felt Lincoln was too timid in
his antislavery beliefs, that he should have done more than he did to bring it
to an end.
Lincoln’s great distinction,
then, was not his conviction, which represented a minority view but certainly
not unique. Instead, it took two forms. The first, of course, is that he’s the
guy who actually ended slavery – or, more precisely, he issued the order as the
head of the U.S. army that set slavery on the road to destruction in the form
of the Emancipation Proclamation, which took effect on January 1, 1863. The
other, more subtle but for our purposes more important thing he did was explain
the end of slavery in a way that became the prevailing common sense ever since.
He did it in a series of speeches in a series of ways, whose essence was that
the only real way to save the country he and others loved was to end a practice
that was destroying it and to give what he called “the last best hope of earth”
a second chance.
Next: Varieties of slavery
Monday, November 11, 2013
Spirited argument
In Radical Jesus: A Graphic History of Faith, Paul Buhle and his collaborators bring a redeemer to life in novel form
The following review has been posted on the Books page of the History News Network.
As a public intellectual, Paul Buhle has had as protean and prolific career inside as well as outside academe as anyone in the last half-century. An acolyte of William Appleman Williams at Wisconsin, and an early member of Students for a Democratic Society, Buhle established himself at the forefront of labor history -- he is the author of a widely read history of the Communist Party of the United States, which has just been reissued in an expanded edition -- before going on to write an authorized biography of Trinidadian writer and activist C.L.R. James. In the 1980s and '90s, Buhle's work turned toward cultural history, producing books on the Hollywood blacklist, among other topics. From his perch at Brown University at the turn of this century, Buhle taught courses in oral history, taking his work in a more ethnographic direction before his retirement from teaching and return to Madison.
Reviewing, however briefly, this storied career seems like a necessary prerequisite for explaining -- and, for this publication at least, explaining why one would review -- Radical Jesus: A Graphic History of Faith, in which Buhle collaborated with well-known artists Sabrina Jones, Gary Dumm, and Nick Thorkelson. In recent years Buhle has argued that historians must take alternative media seriously if they wish to have an impact on the young, and he regards the graphic novel as a promising avenue of that outreach. To that end, he has collaborated on graphic histories of major historical figures as well as graphic renditions of works by writers including Studs Terkel and Howard Zinn.
Radical Jesus, for which Buhle wrote much of the text, is divided into three parts. The first section, by Sabrina Jones, rests heavily on scripture, using the words of Jesus of Nazareth -- not surprisingly, his role as Jesus Christ is not prominent here -- as a point of departure for images that illustrate the political implications of his ideas. A strong element of willful anachronism animates these panels; Jones uses contemporary settings alongside ancient words to vivify the ongoing relevance of Jesus's message. A dramatic sense of line in these black and-white-drawings provide an animating friction for the rectangular organization of the pages.
The second section of the book, "Radical History," is a series of chapters on the role of Christian activism in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Some of these tales, like those of the Lollards, are well known (but with lots of details likely to be of interest to novices). Others, like the story of the Hutterite Brethren, are more obscure. But this mix of what might be termed canonical history along with obscure byways widens the appeal of the stories Buhle and artist Gary Dumm (a frequent collaborator with the late Harvey Pekar) choose to tell.
The final part of "Radical Jesus," by Nick Thorkelsen, carries the to the modern day by looking at a wide variety of social justice issues around the globe. Thorkelsen has a distinctive pluralistic approach to his art -- which is colorful in more than one sense -- that rounds out a distinctive, yet overlapping set of stories, images, and messages.
As a matter of religion, popular culture, and historiography, then, Radical Jesus is a rich and striking social document. It is one worth considering as art, pedagogy, and history.
The following review has been posted on the Books page of the History News Network.
As a public intellectual, Paul Buhle has had as protean and prolific career inside as well as outside academe as anyone in the last half-century. An acolyte of William Appleman Williams at Wisconsin, and an early member of Students for a Democratic Society, Buhle established himself at the forefront of labor history -- he is the author of a widely read history of the Communist Party of the United States, which has just been reissued in an expanded edition -- before going on to write an authorized biography of Trinidadian writer and activist C.L.R. James. In the 1980s and '90s, Buhle's work turned toward cultural history, producing books on the Hollywood blacklist, among other topics. From his perch at Brown University at the turn of this century, Buhle taught courses in oral history, taking his work in a more ethnographic direction before his retirement from teaching and return to Madison.
Reviewing, however briefly, this storied career seems like a necessary prerequisite for explaining -- and, for this publication at least, explaining why one would review -- Radical Jesus: A Graphic History of Faith, in which Buhle collaborated with well-known artists Sabrina Jones, Gary Dumm, and Nick Thorkelson. In recent years Buhle has argued that historians must take alternative media seriously if they wish to have an impact on the young, and he regards the graphic novel as a promising avenue of that outreach. To that end, he has collaborated on graphic histories of major historical figures as well as graphic renditions of works by writers including Studs Terkel and Howard Zinn.
Radical Jesus, for which Buhle wrote much of the text, is divided into three parts. The first section, by Sabrina Jones, rests heavily on scripture, using the words of Jesus of Nazareth -- not surprisingly, his role as Jesus Christ is not prominent here -- as a point of departure for images that illustrate the political implications of his ideas. A strong element of willful anachronism animates these panels; Jones uses contemporary settings alongside ancient words to vivify the ongoing relevance of Jesus's message. A dramatic sense of line in these black and-white-drawings provide an animating friction for the rectangular organization of the pages.
The second section of the book, "Radical History," is a series of chapters on the role of Christian activism in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Some of these tales, like those of the Lollards, are well known (but with lots of details likely to be of interest to novices). Others, like the story of the Hutterite Brethren, are more obscure. But this mix of what might be termed canonical history along with obscure byways widens the appeal of the stories Buhle and artist Gary Dumm (a frequent collaborator with the late Harvey Pekar) choose to tell.
The final part of "Radical Jesus," by Nick Thorkelsen, carries the to the modern day by looking at a wide variety of social justice issues around the globe. Thorkelsen has a distinctive pluralistic approach to his art -- which is colorful in more than one sense -- that rounds out a distinctive, yet overlapping set of stories, images, and messages.
As a matter of religion, popular culture, and historiography, then, Radical Jesus is a rich and striking social document. It is one worth considering as art, pedagogy, and history.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)