The transformation of a myth in the industrial era.
The following post is part of an ongoing series on the self-made man in U.S. History.
“All over the land were
thousands like them, self-made men quick to lay hands on opportunity if it
knocked on the door, ready to seek it out if were slow in knocking, recognizing
no limitations on their powers, discouraged by no shortcomings in their
training.
–Vernon
Parrington, Main Currents in American
Thought, 1927
It has long been understood, in
economics as in so many other ways, that the Civil War marked a dividing line
in American history. Before the war, the United States was an overwhelmingly
agricultural nation with a small mercantile elite; after the war, it became a
modern industrial society in which the factory steadily displaced the farm from
the center of the nation’s consciousness, and the urban worker steadily
displaced the yeoman as the embodiment of the nation’s working classes.
There was also a transformation within
the world of commerce. Andrew Carnegie, who was born into one world but came of
age in the other, described the difference in a famous 1889 essay that
represented the conventional wisdom of the time – and ever since. “Formerly
articles were manufactured at the domestic hearth or in small shops which
formed part of the household,” he wrote. “The master and his apprentices worked
side by side, the latter living with the master, and therefore subject to the
same conditions. When those apprentices rose to become masters, there was
little or no change in their mode of life, and they, in turn, educated in the
same routine succeeding apprentices. There was, substantially, social equality,
and even political equality, for those engaged in industrial pursuits had then
little or no political voice in the State.” While some were inclined to affirm,
even sentimentalize this vision, Carnegie was not among them. “The inevitable
result of such a mode of manufacture was crude articles at high prices,” he
asserted. Far better was the (inevitable) replacement of this regime with a
more efficient, if less egalitarian, system of mass production.
Not everyone agreed such a system was
better, of course. Indeed, a significant part of the history of the 19th
century involved focusing on the ravages of this new order, both in terms of
the material deprivations it imposed on unskilled labor, as well as in the
evisceration of social and political quality. But its reality rarely seriously
questioned; nor was the role of the Civil War in bringing it about. Charles
Francis Adams Jr., in the army, was struck in 1871 by the “greatly enlarged
grasp of enterprise and the increased facility of combination” that
characterized the U.S. economy in the years following 1865. “The great
operations of war, the handling of large masses of men, the lavish expenditure
of unprecedented sums of money, the immense financial operations, the
possibilities of effective co-operation were lessons not likely to be lost on
men quick to receive and to apply all new ideas.”
But, as Adams perceived, the vast new
sense of scale in the American economy was marked by a paradox: the growing scale
of the economy was managed by a shrinking number of individuals. Nowhere was
this more obvious than in the definitive industry of the 19th
century: railroads, presided over by people with names like Vanderbilt, Drew,
Gould, Fisk, and Huntington. “Single men have controlled hundreds of miles of
railway, thousands of men, tens of millions of revenue, and hundreds of
millions of capital,” he noted. “The strength implied in all this they wielded
in practical independence of control both of governments and of individuals;
much as petty German despots might have governed their little principalities a
century or two ago.”
Railroads, along with other forms
industrial capitalism, were springing up all over the world in the second half
of the 19th century, bringing with them great disparities of wealth
and power from Brazil to China. But nowhere were such phenomena more obvious,
even glaring, than in the United States, where equality had long been the
hallmark of American society. And
yet this outcome was not simply a commercial coup d'état by the new breed of
industrialists The fact that they imposed their will begs the question how they
were be allowed to, and why the oppressions caused by their success, while
often loudly protested, never resulted in a successful challenge to their right
to run that they considered their business. Which leads us to an important
reality of the post-Civil War order: it was governed by a cultural logic that
took shape much earlier in the century. At the heart of this logic was a
transformation in the understanding of the self-made man in the decades before
the war.
The key to understanding this transformation was a concept
that had guided the Founding Fathers: natural aristocracy. Charles Francis
Adams Jr.’s great-grandfather had used the term in a 1790 letter to Samuel
Adams. “Nobles have been essential parties in the preservation of liberty,
whenever and wherever it has existed,” John Adams wrote to his cousin. “By
nobles, I mean not peculiarly an hereditary nobility, or any particular
modification, but the natural and actual aristocracy among mankind. The
existence of this you will not deny.”
A generation later, Thomas Jefferson invoked the phrase in his own
correspondence with Adams. “I agree with you that there is a natural
aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents,” Jefferson
explained, contrasting it with “artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and
birth, without either virtue or talents.” This elite was rooted in
accomplishment, not privilege: it was self-made. For all their differences in
temperament, experience, ideology, Adams, Jefferson, and other Founding Fathers
had a deep personal investment in it as the basis of their careers (though
Adams, it should be said, cast a skeptical eye that that it could be engineered
as easily as Jefferson seemed to think it could be).
But the legitimacy was of this self-made
aristocracy went far beyond that: its moral basis was civic. “May we not even
say, that that form of government is the best, which provides the most
effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?” Jefferson asked Adams,
noting that in general, the common people “will elect the really good and
wise.” Adams was not so sure, lamenting the “Stupidity with which the more
numerous multitude” tended to be tricked by fake aristocrats. But he never
doubted the necessity of a natural aristocracy were the republic to survive.
As many subsequent observers have noted,
the Founding Fathers were in an important sense victims of their own success.
In crafting a remarkably tensile Constitution that checked some of the more
venal impulses of their successors, and in bequeathing a nation with relatively
secure boundaries and vast natural resources, they in effect made mediocrity
possible (both Jefferson and Adams were appalled by Andrew Jackson, who wore
his lack of refinement as a badge of honor). Or, to put it more charitably,
they created the possibility for natural aristocracies whose primary impetus
was not civic, the way it had been for Franklin, Clay, and Lincoln. The pursuit
of happiness could take new forms.
Whether as a necessary evil or a
positive good, the Founding Fathers believed that there had to be a place for
the voice of the people in choosing natural aristocrats to be their leaders.
But by the early decades of the nineteenth century, an imperative to create and
maintain that channel of communication – evident in the steady recession of
eligibility requirements for voting, especially in the new territories that
rapidly became states – created democratic imperatives that took on a life of
their own, in large measure because allowing cream to rise was an important
premise of natural aristocracy itself. Today we’re very aware of the glaring
limits of this vision – the way it excluded women, African Americans, Native
Americans, and even many immigrants. But the expansion of the electorate,
typified by the abandonment of property qualifications for voting, created a
polity that was really striking in its relative scale and in the force of
internal logic that would inexorably lead not only to the absorption of such
outsiders, but also the possibility of liberty experienced and expressed
outside the boundaries of traditional politics.
No one captured these dynamics more
vividly than the early 20th century cultural historian Vernon
Parrington, whose three-volume history, Main
Currents in American Thought, remains among the most lively chronicles of
our national life. “Society of a sudden was become fluid,” he wrote of the
early nineteenth century. “Strange figures, sprung from obscure origins, thrust
themselves everywhere upon the scene. In the reaction from the mean and skimpy,
a passionate will to power was issuing from unexpected sources, undisciplined,
confused in ethical values, but endowed with immense vitality. Individualism
was simplified to the acquisitive instinct.” The hallmark of such
figures, whether in the form of frontiersmen like Davy Crockett or showmen like
P.T. Barnum, was the way their notion of the self-made man operated
independently of – even defied – the logic of natural aristocracy. Mobility,
literal and figurative, was becoming an end unto itself.
Next: the transformation of the corporation in 19th century national life.
Next: the transformation of the corporation in 19th century national life.